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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

There, the applicants were responsible for actual mitigation and were
required to excavate an off-site pond, not merely pay money. In the
present case, S & S had dislodged itself from all responsibility by giving
monetary payment and in-kind professional services. The court concluded
that S & S's proposal negated the legislative intent to protect and preserve
the state's wetlands and watercourses, because the monetary payment and
in-kind service proposal removed S & S from all mitigation
responsibilities. Thus, the court held that the lower court incorrectly
decided that the Commission could properly accept monetary payment and
in-kind services in lieu of mitigation.
The court pondered whether the Commission's monetary payment and
in-kind services acceptance was an integral part of the Commission's
decision to grant the permit. The court pointed out that the Commission
approved S & S's proposal only after S & S offered mitigation of monetary
payment and in-kind services. Therefore, the court concluded that the
mitigation was integral to the Commission's decision-making and
invalidated the commission's decision.
Sara Franklin
Wood v. Somers Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No. CV970063972S, 1999 WL
1013118 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1999) (dismissing plaintiffs claim
that the collection, storage, and transportation of spring water were within
the local zoning regulation's definition of agriculture and/or farming).
A Town of Somers zoning enforcement officer issued a cease and
desist order to the plaintiffs, Bruce Wood ("Wood") and David Gavlak
("Gavlak"), in 1996.
A natural free-flowing spring flowed through
Wood's farm. Gavlak, owner of Hillside Spring Water, Inc., leased a part
of Wood's farm to collect, store, and transport the spring water from the
farm for commercial human consumption. The cease and desist order
stated that Wood's and Galvak's activities pertaining to the spring were not
agricultural and/or farming in nature, and thus not permitted by local
zoning regulations.
Wood and Gavlak (collectively "Bottlers") contested the zoning
officer's order before the Somers Zoning Board of Appeals. The Bottlers
argued that their use of the spring was "harvesting" of spring water, and
was thus permitted within the zoning regulation's definition of agriculture
and/or farming. Alternatively, the Bottlers claimed that their use fit the
non-conforming use exception to the zoning regulations because water had
been extracted from the spring for the last 200 years. The Somers Zoning
Board, after a public hearing on the issue, ruled against the Bottlers on
both points. Therefore, the Bottlers brought this claim to the Superior
Court of Connecticut.
The court found no merit for the Bottlers' assertion that the present
use of the spring was a non-conforming use. The court found the Bottlers
could not carry their burden to produce evidence that the use existed at the
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time the zoning regulation was enacted. While the Bottlers were able to
show that the water from the spring had been extracted for personal
consumption for the last 200 years, they were unable to provide any
evidence that the spring water had been collected, stored, and transported
to be sold prior to 1991. Thus, the present use did not exist at the time the
zoning regulations were enacted. Therefore, the court concluded that the
zoning board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily, or abused its discretion in
dismissing the non-conforming use claim.
In addition, the court refused to contradict the zoning board's
decision that "harvesting of spring water" was not within the local zoning
regulation's definition of agriculture and/or farming. The court cited the
record concerning the evidence considered at the public meeting on the
issue. The court also re-emphasized it recognized the wide and liberal
discretion of a local authority in such a determination. Therefore, the
court concluded that the Somers Zoning Board had weighed all of the
appropriate evidence on the issue, and had come to a reasonable decision.
Because the decision was within the board's discretion, the court dismissed
the claim.
Kirk Waible

FLORIDA
Brevard County v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 742 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an order restricting a county's drainage
discharge into a drainage easement in anticipation of future environmental
regulations was improper).
Brevard County ("County") acquired 240 acres of land owned by A.
Duda & Sons, Inc. ("Duda") in order to construct a wetland to aid in
wastewater treatment and disposal. Adding the wetland would increase the
facilities' disposal capacity. The County entered an order of taking for the
240 acres; however, it had to file an amended petition to acquire an
easement over Duda's land known as the 4-Mile Canal. The County
needed the easement so that treated water could flow from the wetland to
Lake Winder, where the treated effluent ultimately ended up.
The possibility that pollutant loading reduction goals and total
maximum daily loads could be imposed on the 4-Mile Canal increased the
chances that pollutants from the County would substantially lessen the
amount of pollutants Duda could discharge from his ranch. Duda wanted a
restriction on the County's use of the easement. The County agreed in
some respects and disagreed in others.
The parties agreed to a non-exclusive easement that could only be used
for specific purposes such as treated effluent or stormwater conveyance, or
water intake from the 4-Mile Canal. The County would have to adhere to
the pollution limits set in the Wastewater Facility Permit and the

